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THE REAL ESTATE CONTRACT
IN NEW MEXICO: EIFERLE v. TOPPINO

I. INTRODUCTION

The use of the real estate contract as a real property security
device was an issue presented to the New Mexico Supreme Court in
the recent case of Eiferle v. Toppino.' The court's holding has raised
a number of questions about the enforceability of the forfeiture
clause in the standard form real estate contract, and the future of the
real estate contract generally. A comparison of the use of the real
estate contract with other real property security devices in New
Mexico and other states supports the hypothesis that Eiferle and
other recent New Mexico cases call for reevaluation of the use of the
real estate contract.
II. A STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In Eiferle, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that the vendor of
a real estate contract could not enforce the terms of the contract
when under the specific facts of the case enforcement would shock
the conscience of the court. 2 The real estate contract involved was
for the purchase and sale of a residence. 3 A standard Valliant Form
Real Estate Contract provided that the purchaser would make a cash
down payment to the vendor, make monthly installment payments
into an escrow account for the vendor, and assume a mortgage with
Prudential Insurance Company.4 The contract provided that both
the monthly payment on the escrow account' and the monthly
payment on the mortgage 6 were due on the first day of each month.
Five years after the parties entered into the real estate contract,
the events which led to this case occurred. The purchaser sent a
check for the monthly mortgage payment on the first day of the
month and also made the installment payment that was due on the
escrow account. On the twentieth day of the month, Prudential
1. 90 N.M. 469, 565 P.2d 340 (1977).
2. Id. at 470, 565 P.2d at 341.
3. Id. at 469, 565 P.2d at 340.

4. Id.
5. Record at 30.
6. 90 N.M. at 469, 565 P.2d at 340.
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returned the check to the purchaser, along with a letter threatening
foreclosure because the bank refused to honor the check. A copy of
this letter was sent to the vendor. The letter advised the purchaser
that he had until the thirty-first day of the month to pay all existing
delinquencies. On the twenty-fifth day of the month, the purchaser
mailed to Prudential a cashier's check for the amount due. Three
days later, the vendor's attorney sent a demand letter to the purchaser requesting payment to Prudential and $25 to cover the
expenses of sending the demand letter. The purchaser received the
demand letter on the twenty-ninth day of the month. By the first
day of the next month, Prudential had applied the cashier's check to
the mortgage. The escrow agent refused to accept any further payments from the purchaser until the $25 was paid to cover the cost of
the demand letter. Two months after the mortgage payment in question was due, the vendor filed a special warranty deed conveying the
7
title to the property back to himself.
In evaluating these facts, the court considered Paragraphs 3 and 8
8
of the real estate contract. Paragraph 3, after reciting the purchase
price and terms of payment, provided:
Further, it is agreed that if this real estate contract is placed by the
Owner in the hands of an attorney upon default by the Purchaser in
the payment of any monies due hereunder for the purpose of
mailing of written demand, pursuant to the termination provision
of Paragraph 8, hereof, the Purchaser shall pay, in addition to the
payment of all other sums required hereunder, the sum of9$25.00 to
cover the costs, expenses, and fees involved in such action.
Paragraph 8 provided:
It is mutually agreed that time is the essence of this contract. Should
the Purchaser fail to make any of the said payments at the respective
times herein specified ... and continue in default for thirty (30)
days after written demand for such payments,.., then the owner
may, at his option, declare the whole amount remaining unpaid to
be then due, and proceed to enforce the payment of the same; or he
paid
may terminate this contract and retain all sums theretofore
premises ....10
hereunder as rental to that date for use of said
7. Id. at 470, 565 P.2d at 341.
8. Id. at 469-70, 565 P.2d at 340-41. Notice that the court cites Paragraph 2 but refers to
the contents of Paragraph 3 of the standard Valliant Real Estate Contract Form. See Record
at 30; a review of the real estate contract reveals that the typist who inserted the purchase
price and terms of payment typed over the first line of Paragraph 3 thereby obliterating the
number "3."
9. Record at 30.
10. Record at 31.
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The court did not apply the general rule that real estate contracts are
enforceable as written and upon default by a purchaser, a vendor is
entitled to terminate the contract, regain possession of the property,
and. retain the payments made as rent. The court said that because
Prudential had given the purchaser an opportunity to meet the payments, which the purchaser did, to allow the vendor to terminate the
contract, retaining the property and the payments, would shock the
conscience of the court. 1'
Two issues were presented to the court by the briefs submitted in
the case. The first was whether the purchaser was actually in default
at the time the demand letter was sent; the second was whether
under the terms of the contract failure to pay within 30 days the $25
to cover the cost of the letter resulted in forfeiture even though the
amount of the original default was paid. 1 2 The omission of the
analysis of these issues from the opinion raises important questions
about the status of the real estate contract in New Mexico. This note
will consider these issues and evaluate the holding of Eiferle v.
Toppino after reviewing the development and use of the real estate
contract.
IIl. DEVELOPMENT AND USE OF THE REAL ESTATE CONTRACT
AND OTHER REAL PROPERTY SECURITY DEVICES
A. Background.
The validity of a contract for the sale of land is judged by the
same rules as apply to contracts generally. It must be definite and
certain as to the essential terms, or capable of being made certain by
legal presumption or custom.' 3 The purchaser takes the equitable
title to the property while the vendor retains the legal title.1" The
main difference between contracts for the sale of land and other
contracts has been the measure of damages.' ' The law has allowed
the vendor to enforce a contract for the sale of land through foreclosure by judicial sale, 6 strict foreclosure by judicial order,' ' strict
foreclosure by condition subsequent and statutory notice," or a
personal judgment for the purchase money.' ' On the vendor's
failure to deliver title, the purchaser is entitled to the difference
11.
12.
13.
14.
15,
16.
17.
18.
19.

90 N.M. at 470, 565 P.2d at 341.
Appellants' Brief-In-Chief and Appellee's Answer Brief.
3 American Law of Property § 11.13 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952).
Id. § 11.22.
Id § 11.67.
Id. § 11.74.
Id. § 11.75.
Id. § 11.76.
Id. § 11.77.
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between the amount of the contract price remaining unpaid and the
market value of the land.2 0
B. Use of the real estate contract and other real property security
devices in New Mexico
The term "real estate contract" may refer to either a security or a
marketing device. In New Mexico, the term is used to describe a
security device, an installment contract, which is used in lieu of a
mortgage or deed of trust. 1
Early New Mexico case law involving real estate contracts established that if the purchaser defaulted after part performance and the
vendor was willing and able to proceed under the2 2contract, the
But absent
purchaser had no right to recover payments made.
definite terms, in a case where the contract was oral, status quo ante
was restored. 2 3 Failure to make payments did not of itself make the
given
contract void or effect a forfeiture; the vendor must have
2
Rea4
notice of his election and intention to forfeit the contract.
it
unless
sonable delay in performance would not defeat a contract
2
New
Subsequent
s
specifically stated that time is of the essence.
Mexico case law has not altered these holdings.
The standard Valliant Form Real Estate Contract used in Eiferle is
26
It provides for the execution of a
commonly used in New Mexico.
warranty deed from the vendor to the purchaser, and the execution
of a special warranty deed from the purchaser to the vendor. The real
estate contract is usually recorded, and the real estate contract and
the deeds are placed in escrow. When the purchaser complies with all
of the conditions of the contract, the warranty deed is delivered by
the escrow agent to the purchaser. If the purchaser defaults, and
remains in default after a written demand for payment, the vendor
may either declare the whole amount remaining unpaid due and sue
for enforcement, or terminate the contract and retain as rental all the
sums paid. If the vendor chooses to terminate the contract, the real
20. Id. § 11.67.
21. The purpose of real estate contract determines whether it is a marketing device or
security device. Deposit-receipt and earnest-money agreements are examples of marketing
devices. Installment contracts, mortgages, and deeds of trust are examples of security
devices. Hetland, Land Contracts, in California Land Security and Development 43 (1960).
See also Hetland, The California Land Contract, 48 Calif. L. Rev. 729 (1960).
22. Melfi v. Goodman, 73 N.M. 320, 388 P.2d 50 (1963); Dunken v. Guess, 40 N.M. 156,
56 P.2d 1123 (1936); Albuquerque Lumber Co. v. Tomei, 32 N.M. 5,250 P. 21 (1926).
23. Young v. Lee, 47 N.M. 120, 138 P.2d 259 (1943).
24. Nelms v. Miller, 56 N.M. 132, 241 P.2d 333 (1952).
25. Viramontesv. Fox, 65 N.M. 275, 335 P.2d 1071 (1959).
26. Telephone conversation with Patricia Espalin, Clerk, Bernalillo County Clerk's Office
in Albuquerque, New Mexico (May 15, 1978).
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estate contract and the special warranty deed are delivered by the
escrow agent to the vendor.2 7
Bishop v. Beecher2 s sets forth the reason for using real estate
contracts in New Mexico:
27. The Valiant Co. Real Estate Contract, Form 103, Paragraphs 3 and 8:
3. In consideration of the premises, the said Purchaser agrees to buy said
real estate and to pay said Owner therefor the sum of
Dollars ($
) lawful money of the United States of America,
which sum is to be paid as follows, to-wit:
Dollars ($
), cash in hand paid, the receipt of which is hereby
acknowledged, and the balance of $
shall be payable as
follows, to-wit:

If not otherwise specified the above-mentioned payments shall continue until
the full purchase price and interest on deferred payments shall have been fully
paid. All of said unpaid balance of the purchase price shall bear interest at the
rate of
per centum (
%) per annum from date, payable
Further, it is agreed that if this Real Estate Contract is placed by the Owner
in the hands of an attorney upon default by the Purchaser in the payment of
any monies due hereunder for the purpose of mailing of written demand,
pursuant to the termination provision of Paragraph 8 hereof, the Purchaser
shall pay, in addition to the payment of all other sums required hereunder, the
sum of $50.00 to cover the costs, expenses, and fees involved in such action.
8. It is mutually agreed that time is the essence of this contract. Should the
Purchaser fail to make any of the said payments at the respective times herein
specified, or fail or refuse to repay any sums advanced by the Owner under the
provisions of the foregoing paragraph, or fail or refuse to pay said taxes,
assessments or other charges against said real estate and continue in default for
days after written demand for such payments,
or payment of taxes or payment of assessments or other charges against said
real estate, or repayment of sums advanced under provisions of the foregoing
paragraph has been mailed to the Purchaser addressed to _
h
-at
then the Owner may, at his option, either declare the whole amount remaining
unpaid to be then due, and proceed to enforce the payment of the same; or he
may terminate this contract and retain all sums theretofore paid hereunder as
rental to that date for the use of said premises, and all rights of the Purchaser
in the premises herein described shall thereupon cease and terminate and h
-shall thereafter be deemed a tenant holding over after the expiration of
_
h
-term
without permission. An affidavit made by said Owner or his
agent showing such default and forfeiture and recorded in the County Clerk's
office shall be conclusive proof, in favor of any subsequent bonafide purchaser
or encumbrancer for value, of such default and forfeiture; and the Purchaser
hereby irrevocably authorizes the Owner or his agent to thus declare and
record such default and forfeiture, and agrees to be bound by such declarations as _
free act and deed.
28. 67 N.M. 339, 355 P.2d 277 (1960).
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[C] ontracts such as this are utilized as devices to allow purchases of
property with very small down payments. This is on the theory that
in gaining the advantage of the elimination of the larger initial investment, the grantee must forego whatever advantage he might obtain
by reason of the delays incident to foreclosure and redemption.
Admittedly, there may be some disadvantages to this type of contract, but it is felt that the advantages far outweigh them when the
benefits, which are derived by thousands of people who have been
enabled to purchase property by merely paying for it over many
years in a manner likened to rent, are considered. 2 9
In Bishop, the court focused on the advantages of the real estate
contract. A purchaser who cannot qualify for a mortgage or cannot
afford a large cash down payment can purchase property with a small
investment. The court did not discuss the disadvantage of real estate
contracts, that is, the purchaser's risk of losing his entire investment
on default at any time before completion of the contract.
Since Bishop, the New Mexico Supreme Court has appeared to
become increasingly critical of real estate contracts. In Davies v.
Boyd 3" the court cited Bishop in comparing the retained payments
to rent and declared that where the forfeiture approximated the
rental value of the property, the contract would be enforced. The
court did not discuss what result might be reached if the forfeiture
were greater than the rental value of the property. However, the
court did point out that where a contract has two possible construcThus it
tions, the construction that avoids forfeiture is followed.'
would be expected that where the amount paid by the purchaser
before default was greater than the rental value of the property, the
forfeiture clause would not be enforced.
In Ott v. Keller3 2 the New Mexico Court of Appeals found two
grounds for dismissing the vendor's complaint. The real estate contract followed the standard form and provided that if the purchaser
continued "in default for fifteen (15) days after written demand for
such payments ... has been mailed to the Purchaser," 3" then the
vendor could terminate the contract and the purchaser would "be
deemed a tenant holding over after the expiration of their [sic] term
without permission." 3 4 The vendor had brought an unlawful detainer action under sections 36-12-1 through 36-12-4 of the New
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id.
73
Id.
90
Id.
Id.

at 342, 355 P.2d at 279.
N.M. 85, 385 P.2d 950 (1963).
at 89, 385 P.2d at 952 (specially concurring opinion).
N.M. 1,558 P.2d 613 (Ct. App. 1976).
at 2, 558 P.2d at 614.
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Mexico statutes based on the provision of the contract quoted above.
The court held, "[a] n equitable owner under a real estate contract
cannot be ousted from possession by a summary proceeding, and the
question of title3 to land cannot be determined in an unlawful
detainer action." 5
In addition, the court held that the purchaser was not in default.3 6 Though the contract provided that the vendor could terminate the contract if the purchaser continued in default for fifteen
days after a demand letter was mailed, the demand letter stated that
the contract would be terminated fifteen days from the effective
date of the notice. The court focused on the demand letter and said
that the equitable construction of that letter was to interpret the
effective date of the notice to be the date the notice was received.
Because the vendor withdrew the papers from escrow exactly fifteen
days after the demand letter was mailed, assuming at least one day
was required for delivery, the vendor withdrew the papers one day
prematurely. The purchaser tendered payment several hours after the
papers were withdrawn from escrow, but the payment was
refused. 3" It is a well accepted principle that if a contract can be
interpreted to avoid forfeiture, it will be so construed. 3 a But the
contract did not provide the construction adopted by the court. The
forfeiture was avoided by considering the demand letter by itself,
rather than in light of the contract.
The mortgage is another frequently used security device for real
property in New Mexico. Usually the vendor executes and delivers a
deed to the purchaser upon receipt of the entire purchase price. The
purchaser obtains the purchase price from a lendor, giving the lendor
a note and a mortgage. Of course it is possible for the vendor to
accept a note and mortgage from the purchaser, but typically, a real
estate contract is used in that situation. In New Mexico, the deed of
trust is subject to the same statutory conditions as the mortgage and
3
is virtually indistinguishable from it. 9
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 3, 558 P.2d at 615.
Id. at 5, 558 P.2d at 617.
Id. at*4-5, 558 P.2d at 616-17.
Davies v. Boyd, 73 N.M. at 89, 385 P.2d at 952 (specially concurring opinion).
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 61-7-7 (Repl. 1974):
Sale of real property under power of sale prohibited.-No real property or
any interest therein shall be sold under or by virtue of any power of sale
contained in any mortgage, mortgage deed, trust deed or any other written
instrument having the effect of a mortgage, which shall have been executed
subsequent to the time this act [this section] shall go into effect.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 70-1-37 to 39 (Repl. 1961):
70-1-37. Mortgage or deed of trust provisions- Effect.-A deed in substance
following the forms entitled "Mortgage" or "Deed of Trust" shall when duly
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executed have the force and effect of a mortgage or deed of trust by way of
mortgage to the use of the mortgagee and his heirs and assigns with mortgage
convenants and upon statutory mortgage conditions as defimed in the following two sections to secure the payment of the money or the performance of
any obligation therein specified. The parties may insert in such mortgage any
other lawful agreement or condition.
70-1-38. Construction of "mortgage covenants."-In a mortgage or deed of
trust by way of mortgage of real estate "mortgage covenants" shall have the
full force and meaning and effect of the followng words and shall be applied
and construed accordingly: "The mortgagor for himself, his heirs, executors,
administrators and successors, covenants with the mortgagee and his heirs,
successors and assigns that he is lawfully seized in fee simple of the granted
premises; that they are free from all encumbrances; that the mortgagor has
good right to sell and convey the same; and that he will, and his heirs,
exeuctors, administrators and successors shall, warrant and defend the same to
the mortgagee and his heirs, successors and assigns forever against the lawful
claims and demands of all persons."
70-1-39. Construction of "statutory mortgage condition."-In a mortgage
or deed of trust by way of mortgage of real estate the words, "statutory
mortgage condition" shall have the full force, meaning and effect of the
following words and shall be applied and construed accordingly: "In the event
any of the following terms, conditions or obligations are broken by the
mortgagor, this mortgage (or deed of trust) shall thereupon at the option of
the mortgagee, be subject to foreclosure and the premises may be sold in the
manner and form provided by law, and the proceeds arising from the sale
thereof shall be applied to the payment of all indebtedness of every kind
owing to the mortgagee by virtue of the terms of this mortgage or by virtue of
the terms of the obligation or obligations secured hereby:
(1) Mortgagor shall pay or perform to mortgagee or his executors, administrators, successors or assigns all amounts and obligations as provided in the
obligation secured hereby and in the manner, form, and at the time or times
provided in said obligation or in any extension thereof.
(2) Mortgagor shall perform the conditions of any prior mortgage,
encumbrance, condition or covenant.
(3) Mortgagor shall pay when due and payable all taxes, charges, and assessments to whomsoever and whenever laid or assessed upon the mortgaged
premises or on any interest therein.
(4) Mortgagor shall, during the continuance of the indebtedness secured
hereby keep all buildings on the mortgaged premises in good repair and shall
not commit or suffer any strip or waste of the mortgaged premises.
(5) Mortgagor shall keep the buildings on.the mortgaged premises insured
in the sum specified and against the hazards specified in the mortgage, for the
benefit of the mortgagee and his executors, administrators, successors and
assigns; such insurance to be in such form and in such insurance companies as
the mortgagee shall approve. Mortgagor shall deliver such policy or policies to
the mortgagee; and at least two [21 days prior to the expiration of any policy
on such premises shall deliver to mortgagee a new and sufficient policy to take
the place of the one [ 1] so expiring.
In the event of the failure or refusal of the mortgagor to keep in repair the
buildings on the mortgaged premises; or to keep the premises insured, or to
deliver the polices of insurance, as provided; or to pay taxes and assessments,
or to perform the conditions of any prior mortgage, encumbrance, covenant
or condition, the mortgagee and its executors, administrators, successors or
assigns may, at his option, make such repairs, or procure such insurance, or
pay such taxes or assessments or perform such conditions and all moneys thus
paid or expenses thus incurred shall be payable by the mortgagor on demand
and shall be so much additional indebtedness secured by the mortgage.

(Vol. 8
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C Utility of the real estate contract compared with other real
property security devices.
The utility of the real estate contract is not a new topic of debate.
Two articles published in the 1930's 4 0 thoroughly discuss this issue
and seem quite relevant to current New Mexico law. The installment
contract for the purchase of land is most often used by purchasers of
small means who are able to make only a small initial payment. A
vendor would be reluctant to sell to such a purchaser if the land
could be reclaimed only with the delay and expense of judicial foreclosure. 4 1 However, if the payments made by the purchaser prior to
default exceed the vendor's damages, the purchaser suffers forfeiture
and the vendor has a windfall. 4 2 One author argued that any amount
retained by the vendor in excess of his injury is a penalty, and the
purchaser should be allowed restitution of that amount.4 The other
author recommended legislative control of real estate contract
remedies, allowing the purchaser to sue for return of payments and
value of improvements less the vendor's damages. 4 4
A more recent commentator indicates that where legislative action
has not been taken, the trend of the case law is to provide relief from
forfeiture. 4 s Courts have avoided forfeitures whenever possible. In
an 1878 case involving a contract for life insurance which included a
forfeiture clause, the United States Supreme Court reviewed the
topic of forfeiture generally and noted, "Forfeitures are not favored
in the law. They are often the means of great oppression and injustice. And, where adequate compensation can be made, the law in
many cases, and equity in all cases, discharges the forfeiture, upon
4
such compensation being made." 6
A series of three articles 4 provides a survey of current legislation
and case law governing interests created by the real estate contract
and remedies for breach of the real estate contract. These articles do
not include New Mexico or specifically discuss a real estate contract
40. Gerdes, Installment Land Contracts: Legislative Protectionsof DefaultingPurchasers,
52 Harv. L. Rev. 129 (1938); Corbin, The Right of a Defaulting Vendee to the Restitution
of Installments Paid, 40 Yale L.J. 1013 (1931).
41. Gerdes, supra note 40, at 130.
42. Id. at 129.
43. Corbin, supra note 40, at 1025-26.
44. Gerdes, supra note 40, at 136-37.
45. G. Pindar, American-Real Estate Law § § 21-24 (1976).
46. Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co. v. Norton, 96 U.S. 234, 242 (1878).
47. Lee, Defaulting Purchaser'sRight to Restitution Under the Installment Land Contract, 20 U. Miami L. Rev. 1 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Purchaser'sRight to Restitution I ;
Lee, Remedies for Breach of the Installment Land Contract, 19 U. Miami L. Rev. 550
(1965); Lee, The Interests Created by the Installment Land Contract, 19 U. Miami L. Rev.
367 (1965).
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providing for placement of deeds in escrow with the vendor's right to
withdraw the deeds on the purchaser's default. But no jurisdiction
was found in which the treatment accorded the parties to a land
contract is satisfactory:
A strict and undeviating application of the majority rule that a party
in default cannot recover payments made will result in unconscionable forfeiture. The application of general equitable principles in an
effort to avoid forfeiture makes for uncertainty .... The results
obtained in the so-called minority jurisdictions are equally unsatisfactory. California labored for many years to shake off the majority
rule only to adopt a position which has rendered the installment
land contract virtually obsolete as a security device in that state.
(Footnotes omitted.) 4"
The California minority rule referred to above was announced in

Barkis v. Scott4 9 in 1949. In that case, the vendor attempted to
terminate a real estate contract after two payment checks from the
purchasers were dishonored for insufficient funds. The purchasers
were a husband and wife. While the husband was in the hospital, the
wife had miscalculated the funds in their checking account. The
court held that it would enforce the forfeiture clause of a real estate
contract only when the purchaser's default resulted from gross
negligence or a wilful breach of duty. After Barkis, the court
extended protection of the purchaser until equitable doctrine completely predominated contract theory.

0

Hetland, an authority in

California property law, confirms the conclusion that adoption of
this minority rule defeated the usefulness of the real estate contract,
and as a result its use has been abandoned. '
In a survey on the use of the real estate contract in Florida, the
author recommended that strict foreclosure be abolished and remedies be controlled by statute.' 2 In a series of three cases,5 I the

Florida courts held that all installment land contracts were to be
treated like mortgages. In 1976, the Florida legislature significantly
amended its "Uniform Land Sales Practices Law" which now states
that the purpose of the law is to prevent unsound financing techniques and to recognize the importance of installment land sales
48. Purchaser'sRight to Restitution, supra note 47, at 19.
49. 34 Cal. 2d 116, 208 P.2d 367 (1949).
50. Note, Reforming the Vendor's Remedies for Breach of Installment Land Sales Contracts, 47 S. Cal. L. Rev. 191 (1973).
51. Hetland, Land Contracts, supra note 21, at 61.
52. Purchaser'sRight to Restitution, supra note 47, at 21-24.
53. Torcise v. Perez, 319 So.2d 41 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Hoffman v. Semet, 316
So.2d 649 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); H & L Land Co. v. Warner, 258 So.2d 293 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1972).
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contracts to the Florida economy.' ' The law provides for a Division
of Florida Land Sales to regulate the use of real estate contracts.' I
The law does not provide remedies for breach of real estate contracts
and there are no recent cases to indicate whether the courts will
continue to apply statutory mortgage remedies to real estate contracts.
The real estate contract has also undergone judicial reform in
Alaska. Land Development, Inc. v. Padgett"6 involved a real estate
contract with the vendor holding the deed to the property as security. The purchaser admitted default but protested forfeiture of a
substantial equitable interest. The trial court determined that the
issue was whether the law would enforce a typical forfeiture clause
strictly in accordance with its terms, and refused to enforce the
forfeiture, giving the purchaser a "period of redemption." ' ' The
Alaska Supreme Court affirmed this decision, holding that enforcement of a forfeiture clause would be inequitable if it resulted in loss
to the purchaser out of proportion to the injury of the vendor, and
that in such situations it is within the court's discretion to grant a
period of redemption.5 8 In subsequent cases, the Alaska court has
relied on this case to avoid the inequitable results of default on real
estate contracts.5 9 Current literature and case law do not indicate
whether the real estate contract will survive reform in Alaska or fall
into disuse there as in California.
Arizona achieved a result similar to Alaska's period of redemption
with a statutory grace period. The length of the grace period ranges
from 30 days to nine months depending on the percentage of the
purchase price paid by the purchaser.6 The purchaser may redeem
54. Fla. Stat. Ann. § § 478.01-.34 (West Supp. 1977).
55. Id. § 478.041.
56. 369 P.2d 888 (Alaska 1962).
57. Id. at 890.
58. Id. at 889-90.
59. E.g., Williams v. Delay, 395 P.2d 839 (Alaska 1964); Jameson v. Wurtz, 396 P.2d 68
(Alaska 1964).
60. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 33-741 (Repl. 1974):
Forfeiture of interest of purchaser in default under contract for conveyance of real property.
A. Forfeiture of the interest of a purchaser in default under a contract for
conveyance of real property may be enforced only after expiration of the
following periods after the default:
1. When the purchaser has paid less than twenty per cent of the purchase
price, thirty days.
2. When the purchaser has paid twenty per cent, or more, but less than
thirty per cent of the purchase price, sixty days.
3. When the purchaser has paid thirty per cent, or more, but less than fifty
per cent of the purchase price, one hundred and twenty days.
4. When the purchaser has paid fifty per cent, or more, of the purchase
price, nine months.
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his interest and avoid forfeiture by complying with the terms of the
real estate contract within the statutory grace period.' However,
the use of the real estate contract in Arizona has rapidly declined in
the last few years.6 2
As the use of the real estate contract has declined in some states,
the use of the deed of trust has increased. A number of states permit
the use of the deed of trust by statute.' ' The main reason for the
popularity of the deed of trust is that it avoids both the forfeiture
aspect of the real estate contract and the expense and delay of the
mortgage for foreclosure.6 4
In California, the deed of trust has become the most common real
property security device, with mortgages and real estate contracts
disappearing from use. s There are no statutory provisions dictating
its form or effect, the deed of trust relying entirely on common use
and case law for its development. 6 6 One commentator, writing for
the Committee on Continuing Education of the Bar, has defined the
deed of trust as a "written instrument by which the owner of property, called the trustor, who usually also is the debtor or obligor,
grants the property to a trustee 'in trust with power of sale' to secure
to a creditor or obligee, called the beneficiary, the payment or performance of the obligation." 6 7 In a deed of trust transaction, the
vendor executes and delivers a deed to the purchaser. The purchaser
gives a note to the vendor or lender, and a deed of trust as security
for the debt to a third party trustee. The main difference between
the deed of trust and the mortgage is the power of sale. 6 8 The
practical effect is that if the purchaser defaults, the trustee has the
power to sell the property and distribute the proceeds. The procedure for non-judicial foreclosure is strictly controlled by statute.6 9
In 1971, the Arizona Revised Statutes were amended to permit
'

61. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 33-742 (Repl. 1974).
62. See text accompanying note 71, infra.
63. E.g., Alaska Stat. § § 34.20.070-.20.135 (Supp. 1977); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § § 33-801
to 821 (Repl. 1974); Idaho Code § § 45-1502 to 1515 (Repl. 1977); Mont. Rev. Codes
Ann. § § 52-401 to 417 (Supp. 1975); Nev. Rev. Stat. § § 107.020-.100 (1973); Wash. Rev.
Code § § 61.24.010-24.130 (Supp. 1976).
64. Rarick, The Background for the Proposed Deed of Trust Legislation, 40 Okla. B.
Ass'n J. 215, 216-7 (1969); Gose, The Trust Deed Act in Washington, 41 Wash. L. Rev. 94
(1966); Galbraith, Gant, & Leen, Due Process and Deeds of Trust-StrangeBedfellows?, 48
Wash. L. Rev. 763, 764-65 (1972-73).
65. Eagen, Deed of Trust Transactions, in California Land and Security Development 3,
5 (1960).
66. Id. at 8.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 6; Comment, Comparison of California Mortgages, Trust Deeds and Land Sale
Contracts, 7 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 83, 89 (1960).
69. Cal. Civ. Code § § 2924, 2953 (West 1974, Supp. 1977).
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the use of the deed of trust. 70 This entensive revision exlcuded the
deed of trust from existing sections controlling foreclosure of
mortgages and included a new chapter dictating form and effect of
the deed of trust and providing for non-judicial foreclosure. Only a
year after the statutory changes, the deed of trust was recognized as
a boon to both creditors and debtors because the non-judicial foreclosure was so much more efficient and economical than judicial
foreclosure: uncontested non-judicial foreclosures take only 91 days
7
while uncontested judicial foreclosures take at least nine months. 1
In both California and Arizona, a non-judicial foreclosure proceeds
much like a judicial foreclosure in New Mexico except that the
trustee does not have to obtain a judgment from the court. If the
purchaser defaults on the real estate contract, the trustee gives notice
to the purchaser of default and of the time and place of the sale. The
statutes require specific forms of notice, a particular time lapse
between notice and sale (e.g., 90 days in Arizona), and that the sale
occur during certain hours in a particular location. The statutes also
provide for the offer and acceptance of bids at the sale, payment of
the bid, and disposition of the money received in payment. 7 2
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE HOLDING IN EIFERLE v. TOPPINO

As discussed above, the issues presented by counsels' briefs in
Eiferle were whether the purchaser was in default when the demand
letter was sent, and if so, whether failure to pay the $25 cost of the
demand letter was a continuing default which would support forfeiture. According to the terms of the contract, the payment was due
on the first day of the month. The purchaser argued that the default
was cured before the letter of default was sent because the cashier's
check was purchased on the twenty-fifth day of the month. 7 3 The
vendor did not respond to this, but argued that the purchaser's
default caused the vendor to send the demand letter and therefore
the purchaser owed the $25 whether or not the purchaser was still in
default when the demand letter was sent. 7 4
70. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § § 10-481 to 485, -802 (Repl. 1977); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § § 33-702,
-721,-742, -801 to 821,-1103 (Repl. 1974, Supp. 1977-78).
71. Fry, The Deed of Trust: A New Device in Arizona Real Estate Financing,7 Ariz. B.J.
No. 3, 5 (1972); accord, Andreola v. Arizona Bank, 26 Ariz. App. 556, -, 550 P.2d 110, 113
(1976); Lawyer, The Deed of Trust: Arizona's Alternative to the Real Property Mortgage,
15Ariz. L. Rev. 194 (1973).
72. Cal. Civ. Code § § 2924, 2953 (West 1974, Supp. 1977); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § § 33-807
to 818 (Repl. 1974).
73. Appellants' Brief-In-Chief at 3-4, Eiferle v. Toppino, 90 N.M. 469, 565 P.2d 340
(1977).
74. Appellee's Answer Brief at 2-3.
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It seems that a logical response to the purchaser's contention is
that purchase of a cashier's check does not satisfy the terms of the
real estate contract. The real estate contract called for payment, and
the stipulated facts alleged only that payment was received by the
first day of the second month. The purchaser failed to show that
payment had been made at the time the demand letter was sent on
the twenty-eighth day. From this line of reasoning, it could be
argued that the purchaser was in default when the demand letter was
sent.
The purchaser, relying on Barkis v. Scott,7 I argued that payment
by a check dishonored by the bank is not a substantial breach when
the purchaser was not grossly negligent or wilfully in breach of the
real estate contract. 7 6
The purchaser then argued that even if he were in default, the
failure to pay the $25 cost of the demand letter would not support
forfeiture of the purchaser's equity. This argument relied primarily
on the rule applied in the recent Alaska decisions that equity will not
allow forfeiture where the purchaser's loss would be disproportionate
to the vendor's injury. 7
The vendor basically relied on the development of the real estate
contract in New Mexico and pointed out that the trend has been to
enforce the terms of the real estate contract. The contract provided
that it was the purchaser's obligation to pay the cost of the demand
letter, and the result of the purchaser's failure to meet obligations of
the contract was forfeiture.
But the court did not discuss these arguments. It held that the
demand letter was premature and of no effect because Prudential,
the holder of the mortgage assumed in the real estate contract, had
given the purchaser until the thirty-first day of the month to make
payment. 7 8 The court did not discuss the basis for Prudential's
authority to extend the time for payment set by the contract
between the purchaser and the vendor. The court seems to be striving
to avoid forfeiture without applying the established principles of
equity. This leaves in question the results in cases involving real
estate contracts yet to come before the court.
V. THE FUTURE OF THE REAL ESTATE CONTRACT IN NEW MEXICO
There are a number of possible alternatives to consider in pre75. 34 Cal. 2d 116, 208 P.2d 367 (1949). See text accompanying notes 48, 49 for a
description of the Barkis case.
76. Appellants' Brief-In-Chief at 6-8.
77. Appellants' Brief-In-Chief at 6-8. Id.
78. Eiferle v. Toppino, 90 N.M. at 470, 565 P.2d at 341.
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dicting the future of the real estate contract in New Mexico. One is
that the court may refuse to enforce forfeiture clauses. Ott and
Eiferle may be the beginning of a trend of case by case evaluation of
fact patterns to find any possible construction of the contract or a
subsequent agreement that will avoid forfeiture. Although the New
Mexico Supreme Court has thus far declined to take the bold step of
judicial reform taken by the courts of Alaska, it has laid the ground
work in Bishop and Davis by comparing the purchaser's forfeiture to
the rental value of the property. An extension of these cases could
lead to an actual balancing of the amount paid by the purchaser with
the loss of the vendor, and result in an equitable period of redemption or restitution where the amount paid by the purchaser exceeds
the vendor's loss. This is similar to what occurred in California and
resulted in the discontinuance of the use of the real estate con7
tract. 9
A second possibility is that the court may declare the real estate
contract a mortgage and as such, subject to judicial foreclosure.
While there is little basis in the New Mexico case law to support the
notion, it seems possible that if a case arises where enforcement of
the forfeiture clause would result in extremely disproportionate loss
and yet nonenforcement would leave a wilfully defaulting purchaser
flaunting a vendor without remedy, the court might order foreclosure. This was the path taken by the Florida courts which led to
legislative action. 0
A third possibility is that the legislature might effect some control
over the real estate contract and provide a statutory redemption
period based on the principles that led the Alaska courts and the
Arizona legislature to provide a period of redemption. According to
one author,
[t] he goal of any reform in the treatment accorded the installment
land contract should be to preserve as many of its advantages as are
consistent with securing the purchaser against unjust forfeiture, and
at the same time permit the contract to operate under a clear and
recognized standard so that the effect of the purchaser's breach may
be predicted. 8 1

The demise of the real estate contract in a number of states, as
well as the difficulty encountered with statutory remedies in other
states, should lead us to question the advantage of the real estate
contract. The advantage is that the vendor is willing to sell to a
79. See text accompanying notes 30-31, 48-51,supra.
80. See text accompanying notes 53-55, supra.
81. Purchaser'sRight to Restitution, supra note 47, at 19.
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purchaser with minimal assets because if the purchaser fails to make
monthly payments toward the vendor's equity and the assumed
mortgage, the vendor can recover his property without incurring the
financial expense and loss of time required by judicial foreclosure.
The continued use of the real estate contract in New Mexico seems
to be primarily a method of avoiding judicial foreclosure. But why
should vendors and purchasers of real property in New Mexico have
to risk uncertain enforcement of contract terms and forfeiture of
equity if they cannot afford a mortgage and judicial foreclosure?
This suggests another possibility: legislative revision to allow use of
the deed of trust and non-judicial foreclosure.
The successful long-term use of the deed of trust in California and
other states shows that the deed of trust could also be used successfully in New Mexico. The relatively recent revision of the Arizona
statutes to allow the use of the deed of trust provides a framework
for similar revision of the New Mexico statutes. This would require
repeal of the statute prohibiting the sale of real property under
power of sale contained in any mortgage, mortgage deed, trust deed
or any other written instrument; 8 2 and adoption of statutes providing a procedure for non-judicial foreclosure.
VI. CONCLUSION
The already uneasy status of the real estate contract in New
Mexico is left more unsettled by the decision in Eiferle v. Toppino.
The New Mexico Supreme Court is hesitant to enforce the standard
real estate contract forfeiture clause, the heart of the real estate
contract and yet, the court is unwilling to decide that such a clause
violates public policy. The clause remains valid but its enforceability
may now be in question.
The real estate contract has fallen into disuse in a number of states
in spite of both statutory and judicial reform, as the deed of trust
with power of sale has become a common real property security
device. The legislature should adopt a statutory redemption period to
avoid inequitable results of default on real estate contracts, and a
deed of trust statute to provide for non-judicial foreclosure.
CAROL JEAN PENNOCK

82. See note 39, supra.

